All countries except South Africa were listed on the back of Uganda’s post-independence passports until apartheid ended in 1994.
The policy symbolized Uganda’s refusal to recognize apartheid and its solidarity with South Africa’s liberation struggle. Further support was extended to fleeing South African liberation movements.
The Ugandan government funded education and relocation programs for South African exiles. Decades later, South Africa has experienced repeated outbreaks of xenophobic violence that have killed, injured, and displaced many Ugandans and other African nationals.
These attacks have often been fuelled by claims that foreign Africans are responsible for local economic woes and unemployment. Critics argue that Pretoria has responded too slowly to recurring xenophobic attacks.
Official reports put the number of Ugandans with formal documents at 50,000. According to the African Centre for Migration and Society, South Africa has experienced more than 40 major attacks on immigrants across eight of the last thirteen years.
Nonetheless, Uganda has avoided exerting sustained public pressure on South Africa over these attacks. Despite Uganda’s solidarity with South Africa, thousands of Ugandans face recurring xenophobic violence with little meaningful response from Pretoria.
Rather than relying solely on diplomatic protests, Uganda should consider leveraging South African multinational companies operating within its borders. The government can use economic diplomacy to pressure South African authorities into taking stronger action against the violence directed at Ugandans.
Economic diplomacy is the strategic use of economic statecraft to persuade target nations to protect the critical interests of another nation. These controls have proven effective elsewhere because governments are typically more responsive to influential domestic corporations than to weaker foreign states.
Major South African firms operating in Uganda include MTN, Stanbic, Absa and Sanlam Allianz. The Government of Uganda can employ its leverage over these businesses by taking the following actions: First, through the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), it can launch meticulous, continuous transfer pricing audits and strict tax compliance reviews on South African companies.
Second, the Bank of Uganda can implement rigorous central bank oversight on corporate profit repatriation. This will slow down the physical transit of capital back to South Africa and is consistent with broader macroeconomic and foreign exchange objectives.
Local content and equity restructuring can be enforced to compel these firms, which are among the biggest taxpayers in the country, to float a higher percentage of their shares on the local stock exchange.
Likewise, these firms can be required to transfer substantial equity to Ugandan-owned entities. MTN’s local listing still leaves Ugandans with only a small ownership stake. Uganda could require South African retailers to source more goods and services locally, reducing dependence on imports from South Africa.
This will signal to these corporations that their near-monopolies are being systematically broken down as a direct consequence of Pretoria’s tolerance of xenophobic violence. This could prompt these corporations to lean heavily on their government to restore diplomatic goodwill.
Enhanced regulatory scrutiny regarding spectrum allocations (for telecoms), banking license renewals, and data protection compliance protocols should be introduced. The government can tighten the issuance and renewal of work visas for South African executives managing operations in Kampala.
This would then encourage companies to rely more heavily on local professionals, only resorting to foreign labour where local workers cannot fill the skills gap. By disrupting the ease of their day-to-day administration, Uganda creates an environment where South African companies use their clout to ensure that foreign nationals are safe, or else face reciprocal structural headaches.
Authorities in Kampala can also exclude South African entities from major government bids, infrastructure projects, and state banking portfolios, citing asymmetrical bilateral relations, and divert such bids to entities from countries with which Uganda has good trade relations.
These measures could be designed within Uganda’s existing legal frameworks. One such condition is making provisions in the procurement law where bidders who reside in countries that give Ugandans comparable market access are given priority.
By doing this, corporations fearing nationalist boycotts or the eventual loss of state contracts will actively pressure their home government to change its stance on immigration and effectively protect foreigners in order to safeguard South Africa’s broader continental footprint.
The concept of turning foreign companies into proxy lobbyists has been successfully used in international economic diplomacy. China has similarly used regulatory pressure to encourage foreign corporations to lobby for more stable bilateral relations.
By applying these manoeuvres, the host government avoids violating international law while successfully converting foreign corporate executives into effective proxy diplomats.
What’s more, Uganda retains plausible deniability because it can claim it is simply enforcing local tax laws, consumer protection, or labour standards. For this strategy to work, the state must be willing to sacrifice a portion of its immediate tax revenue to achieve the vital geopolitical objective of protecting its citizens abroad and asserting its national sovereignty.
Presently, the risk of retaliation from South Africa is low because it is under scrutiny from the entire African continent. If South Africa were to retaliate economically, it would have to apply these measures to the whole continent, which would collapse its own economy.
Currently, the government of Uganda has responded to the anti-immigration attacks with direct diplomacy rather than economic warfare. When The Observer contacted Uganda’s ambassador to South Africa, Paul Amoru, concerning the crisis, he said the evacuation of vulnerable Ugandans from South Africa was voluntary and precautionary, not ordered by Pretoria.
He noted that South Africa had condemned the xenophobic attacks and increased security, saying, “On June 30, the government of South Africa deployed heavily, and there has been a visible military presence on the ground provided by the government.”
Amoru stressed that the attacks do not reflect official South African policy, stating, “It is not the official policy of the government of South Africa to harass foreigners. Going forward, ties with Pretoria will not be affected, but through diplomatic channels, Uganda will ask Pretoria to deal with vigilante groups.”
He confirmed that three Ugandans had been killed, with the Ugandan government covering repatriation costs and supporting bereaved families.
“President Museveni is supporting funeral arrangements with shs 10 million for each of the deceased’s families.”
Amoru added that more than 1,000 returnees had been enrolled at Kyankwanzi, where President Museveni passed them out on July 20 with Shs 2bn Sacco support. Regarding children born abroad, he said, “Some of the returnees have children who are stateless. So, the government, through NIRA, is processing official documents for them. All these government agencies are currently camped at Kyankwanzi.”
He concluded that the repatriation effort had only been possible because of the cooperation and support of the South African government. The Observer reached out to officials of the South African embassy in Kampala for comment but received no response.
As it is, the ongoing anti-immigration crisis in South Africa is rooted in unemployment, the lingering scars of apartheid, and allegations that foreign powers are fuelling violence. This situation is damaging the country’s international image.
Whatever the cause, foreigners, including Ugandans, remain caught in the crossfire. Therefore, Uganda must stay ahead by implementing economic measures that protect its sovereignty and assert its diplomatic stance, just as it did during the apartheid era.
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