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On Wednesday, August 20, 2025, the ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced an agreement with Washington to accept Third Country Nationals who “may not be granted asylum in the U.S. but are reluctant to or may have concerns about returning home.”
Permanent Secretary Vincent Bagiire Waiswa assured the public that the arrangement was temporary, excluding deportees with criminal records or unaccompanied minors. He added that Uganda preferred deportees of African origin, with details under negotiation.
The U.S.–Uganda deportation agreement raises concerns about compliance with legal and diplomatic principles. These concerns are further underscored by the case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia.
The BBC recently reported that Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a Salvadoran, faced deportation to Uganda after rejecting a plea deal. Earlier this year, the Trump administration erroneously deported him to El Salvador’s Cecot prison, before returning him to the U.S., where he now faces human trafficking charges.
Abrego’s refusal to plead guilty to trafficking in exchange for deportation to Costa Rica complicates matters. Uganda has already excluded criminal deportees and shown preference for African nationals.
Though Abrego has not been convicted, the U.S. insistence on sending him to Uganda — affirmed by the Department of Homeland Security—contradicts Uganda’s stated terms.
These risks undermine sovereignty, as Abrego has neither nationality nor cultural ties with Africa. Uganda is a dualist state; international law is not automatically domesticated.
Article 123 (2) of the Constitution requires parliament to pass laws regulating treaty ratification. Section 2 (a) of the Ratification of Treaties Act (RTA) empowers the cabinet to ratify treaties other than those listed in paragraph.
(b) The U.S.–Uganda arrangement falls under Section 2 (a). Article 117 of the Constitution makes the cabinet collectively responsible for its decisions. The MFA’s announcement suggests legal processes were followed.
While the deal is likely to proceed, public reception will probably be hostile. The agreement has not been released for scrutiny, raising doubts about Uganda’s benefits. Without transparency, scepticism will grow, undermining confidence.
Unless the MFA outlines Uganda’s gains, the arrangement will appear one-sided and detrimental to national interests. Kampala’s relations with Washington have recently been strained.
In April, the U.S. imposed a 10 per cent tariff on Ugandan exports, raised to 15 per cent in July. In June, Uganda was among 36 states recommended for entry suspension. Several senior officials also remain under U.S. sanctions.
According to State Minister Henry Oryem, ongoing talks cover visas, tariffs, sanctions and AGOA. The deportation deal could improve Kampala’s standing and potentially secure better trade and visa terms.
However, deporting individuals with no Ugandan or African ties threatens Uganda’s international image. Should Abrego’s deportation occur, Uganda risks being viewed not as an equal partner but as a dumping ground for unwanted deportees.
Precedents such as the UK–Rwanda and Australia–Nauru arrangements show that third-country deportation deals face legal challenges and condemnation for undermining sovereignty and human rights.
The writer works with Kalikumutima and Co. Advocates.
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